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AN OLYMPIC JOKE: SANCTIONING THE 
OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 
Angela Gamalski 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) leads the modern 
Olympic Movement and controls the pinnacle quadrennial sporting 
event, the Olympic Games. Through a tightly-organized bureaucracy, the 
IOC asserts control over athletes, nations, and sponsors alike to assure a 
picture-perfect event. Recurrent scandals amidst the Olympics, including 
human rights abuses, state-sanctioned doping, and bidding corruption, 
can be traced back to the IOC. While it is quick to condemn and control 
others, the IOC has yet to take true responsibility for any of these 
systematic failures or abuses.  
The IOC will demand accountability when untaxed revenues are 
available for the taking and will wash its hands or look the other way 
when a blemish to its reputation or threat to its revenues is perceived. 
Can any entity demand legal accountability from the IOC in the wake of 
its ongoing leadership failures? This paper explores the arguments by 
which international courts, state actors, and those in the Olympic 
Movement can demand accountability from the IOC, and ultimately 
improve the Olympic experience for all.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a 
peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced 
without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which 
requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship solidarity and 
fair play.”1 
Under the Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone has the right to 
rest and leisure,”2 and sport participation is a quintessential leisure 
activity. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) further asserts “the 
practice of sport is a human right.”3 What international regulations and 
sanctions can be imposed if that human right is violated? 
The earliest Olympic Games were held over 2,700 years ago in 
ancient Greece.4 While the Games were officially nothing more than a 
memory for 1,500 years,5 they inspired a legacy and spirit which 
remained as a sort of cultural mythos.6 The present-day Olympic 
Movement traces its lineage to Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who formed 
the first International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894.7  
The modern Olympic Movement has noble beginnings, both literally 
and figuratively. Baron de Coubertin envisioned the Olympic Games as a 
means to improve the physical, moral and social character of his native 
France through “a grand project of international breadth.”8 Members of 
  
 1. Promoting Olympism In Society, OLYMPIC.ORG, https://www.olympic.org/the-
ioc/promote-olympism (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).  
 2. G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 24 (Dec. 10, 1948).  
 3. International Olympic Committee [IOC], OLYMPIC CHARTER, at 11(Aug. 2, 
2015).  
 4. History, OLYMPIC, https://www.olympic.org/ancient-olympic-games/history 
(last accessed October 3, 2017).  
 5. Id. The original Olympics were discontinued after 393 A.D. Id.; see also The 
Real Story of the Ancient Olympic games: The Games, Penn Museum, 
https://www.penn.museum/sites/olympics/olympicorigins.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 
2018). 
 6. DAVID GOLDBLATT, THE GAMES: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE OLYMPICS 9–11 
(2016).  
 7. DAVID MILLER, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE IOC 
33 (2012). 
 8. Id. at 29. 
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the first IOC were recruited from the noble and ruling classes in order to 
build the prestige of the group.9  
What do the Olympics stand for in the twenty-first century? The 
image of an athlete smiling and holding a gold medal atop a podium as 
their country’s national anthem plays and the world stops to marvel at 
human achievement may be what first comes to mind.10 There will be no 
coverage of the impoverished families evicted to make way for the 
Olympic Village where the athlete had stayed11 or the human-rights 
abuses to which laborers were subjected in construction of the athletic 
facilities.12 There will be no discussion of the ways in which the athlete’s 
nation of origin sought to enhance the performance of members of its 
team13 or the potential team members silenced and disqualified within the 
nation for raising concerns of abusive practices by coaches and training 
programs.14  
  
 9. Id. at 33. 
 10. See, e.g., Sterling Xie, Olympic 2014 Results: Medal Winners and Highlights 
from Each Event on Final Day, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1971092-olympic-2014-results-medal-winners-and-
highlights-from-each-event-on-final-day (depicting an image of three athletes on 
podium). 
 11. E.g., DANIELA FICHINO ET AL., GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA 
PROFESSIONALS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE OLYMPIC CITY 20 (2016), 
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2016-08-human-rights-violations-olympic-
city.pdf (noting over 75,000 people forcibly evicted from largely impoverished areas to 
make way for facilities used in the 2016 Rio Games).  
 12. See Sue Reisinger, Track Star Turned Attorney Helps Put First Anti-
Corruption Clause in Olympic Host Contract, CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/8ce1babf-deda-4fdf-92f2-
d966473a142b/?context=1000516.  
 13. See, e.g., Fola Akinnibi, Athletes, Officials Pitch Congress On Anti-Doping 
Reform, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2017, 2:54 PM) 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/905406b5-4b9f-4c6e-bdf8-
de587851751d/?context=1000516.  
 14. See, e.g., Will Hobson & Steven Rich, An athlete accused her coach of sex 
abuse. Olympic officials stayed on the sideline, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/an-athlete-accused-her-coach-of-sex-
abuse-olympic-officials-stayed-on-sideline/2017/02/14/35a6fc76-d2eb-11e6-a783-
cd3fa950f2fd_story.html. See also SAFE4ATHLETES, http://safe4athletes.org (last visited 
September 9, 2017).  
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Few people would ever assume that those who are called “volunteers” 
at the Olympic Games are in fact well-compensated,15 and the Olympic 
leadership treats itself to hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in 
perks as a means of “athlete support.”16 The cameras will be long gone 
by the time the athlete has returned home and is in need of financial, 
medical or psychological support.17 
  At its core, the Olympics are not a bi-annual spectacle, but a 
massive cesspool of corruption on both a financial and performance 
level, which leave a trail of human-rights abuses in its wake. Every two 
years, the media hype leading up to the Games will include mention of 
construction costs that far exceed the amount budgeted by the host city in 
their bid18 submitted years before.19 Occasionally, media attention is 
given to the plight and decay of Olympic facilities years after the Games 
have left their host cities.20  
While some Olympians have begun to publicly question the future of 
their own sports on the world stage,21 it is time to question the role of the 
IOC itself given its position of authority over all Olympic matters. This 
paper will address the legal means by which the IOC as a legal person 
  
 15. Will Hobson, Olympic executives cash in on a ‘Movement’ that keeps athletes 
poor, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/olympic-executives-cash-in-on-a-
movement-that-keeps-athletes-poor/2016/07/30/ed18c206-5346-11e6-88eb-
7dda4e2f2aec_story.html.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Jodi Xu, China’s Disposable Athletes, TIME (July 17, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1644120,00.html (discussing a medaled 
athlete who is without recourse after retirement from competitions, despite past 
assurances that China would provide for athletes for the rest of their lives).  
 18. Charles Riley, Nobody wants to host the Olympic Games, CNNMONEY SPORT 
(Oct. 11, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/11/news/olympic-games-cost-
rome-2024/index.html. Riley notes that multiple cities that have withdrawn bids for 
future Olympic Games, most notably Boston, Massachusetts, as taxpayer-funded projects 
routinely return little discernable economic benefit. See id. 
 19. See id. (Bidding for the 2024 Summer Games occurred in 2016–2017). 
 20. E.g., Sam Belden, What abandoned Olympic venues from around the world 
look like today, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2017, 4:33PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/abandoned-olympic-venues-around-the-world-photos-
rio-2016-8.  
 21. MILLER, supra note 7, at 9 (interviewing Michael Johnson, five-time Olympic 
champion). 
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can be held accountable for its actions or inactions that result in a 
violation of human rights. Section II of this paper provides the 
background of the IOC’s formal structure and its current legal 
relationships. Section III will explain how the IOC’s self-imposed rules 
have failed thus far, as well as those reforms attempted amid past 
controversies. Part IV of this paper will cover two means by which the 
IOC’s structural failures can be rectified to ultimately preserve the 
Olympic Games: first, as a means of international judicial authority, 
which could be exercised against a legal person such as the IOC; second, 
as a system by which nations can pre-emptively regulate an entity 
through treaties and agreements. 
II. THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE IOC IN BRIEF 
The IOC operates without legal accountability to any entity. The IOC 
is the self-appointed supreme authority of the Olympic Movement22 and 
has granted itself binding decision-making authority over “any person or 
organisation [sic] belonging in any capacity . . . to the Olympic 
Movement.”23 This power and position is by design: the IOC’s founding 
members were oligarchs who brought the fledging group the prestige 
necessary to achieve de Coubertin’s vision.24 IOC members then serve as 
ambassadors from the IOC to their country of origin.25 
The IOC is recognized for having a unique international position. The 
United Nations has given the IOC recognition for its role in sports 
development.26 Legally, the IOC is a nongovernmental, non-profit 
organization, recognized in 2000 as a legal person following an 
agreement with the Swiss Federal Council.27 The IOC operates in 
  
 22. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1, at 17.  
 23. Id. at 18, ¶ 4.  
 24. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 33. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Nick Butler, IOC Pledge to work “even harder” after sport included within 
UN Development goals, INSIDE THE GAMES (Sept. 26, 2015), 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1030492/ioc-pledge-to-work-even-harder-after-
sport-included-within-un-development-goals (referencing G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 37 (Sept. 25, 
2015)). 
 27. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1, at 33. 
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Lausanne, Switzerland as a “guest” of the Swiss government.28 The 
Swiss government has financial and privacy laws which benefit the IOC 
and the many other organizations based there.29 For example, until 
recently, bribery activities were not per se illegal under Swiss law.30 
There are three main parties of the Olympic Movement: the IOC, the 
International Sports Federations (IFs), and National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs).31 Each of these major parties has subsidiaries, such 
as national sports clubs and, ultimately, the athletes who actually 
participate in sport.32 The IOC is empowered to grant revenues to IFs and 
NOCs, among others, to facilitate development of the Olympic 
Movement.33 The World Anti-Doping Association (WADA) and the 
International Court for Arbitration of Sport (ICAS) were founded by the 
IOC and now are semi-autonomous entities within the IOC bureaucracy. 
This largely decentralized power structure allows the IOC to operate 
across the globe while retaining ultimate control over the direction of the 
Olympic Movement. As will be discussed below, the IOC asserts that 
control inasmuch as it benefits the IOC, its image, and bank accounts.34 
A. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
Affairs of the IOC are managed by its Executive Board. The IOC 
Session elects Executive Board members, who include royalty and 
former business and sports executives.35 In a sense, the political stature of 
the IOC members has not changed significantly since the time of the 
founding of the Olympic Movement. The Executive Board is the ultimate 
authority of the IOC: decisions by the Executive Board are final and 
  
 28. Id. at ¶ 2.  
 29. Swiss MPs pass ‘Lex Fifa’ anti-corruption law, SWISSINFO (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/clamping-down_swiss-mps-pass--u2018lex-fifa-
u2019-anti-corruption-law/41652890. 
 30. Id.  
 31. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 2, at 17. 
 32. Id. at ¶ 2–3.  
 33. Id. at 54, ¶ 2.  
 34. See infra Section II.A.  
 35. See generally IOC Executive Board, OLYMPIC.ORG, 
https://www.olympic.org/executive-board, (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
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without appeal.36 There is no balance of power by which the IOC Session 
can counter an Executive Board decision. The IOC Executive Board is 
empowered to establish sub-commissions which may report to the IOC 
Session.37 All entities report to the Executive Board.38  Two IOC sub-
commissions of note include the Ethics Commission and the Legal 
Affairs Commission.  
The IOC Ethics Commission (EC) was established as a permanent 
entity within the IOC in the aftermath of the Salt Lake City scandal.39 
The first members of the permanent EC established what is now the 
IOC’s Code of Ethics.40 The EC is empowered to independently 
investigate potential ethics violations, but sanctions are proposed by the 
EC to the IOC Executive Board for review.41 The EC is comprised of 
nine members, including both former and active IOC members and some 
who are independent of the IOC and sport completely.42 As of September 
2017, the current IOC EC chair is former United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon.43 
The Legal Affairs Commission has “both a consultative and 
operational role” in advising the IOC Executive Board.44 This IOC 
commission is not directly established by the Charter Bye-laws.45 Legal 
Affairs Commission members are practicing attorneys from both Europe 
and the United States. The Legal Affairs Commission, unlike the Ethics 
Commission, is not a standing entity, but one assembled as needed.46 It is 
  
 36. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1, at 105. In some cases, a dispute may be resolved by 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. MILLER, supra note 7, at 331. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Ethics Commission, OLYMPIC.ORG, https://www.olympic.org/ethics-
commission (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Liam Morgan, Ban Ki-moon promises to improve accountability of IOC as 
members speak out on corruption allegations, INSIDE THE GAMES (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1055403/ban-ki-moon-vows-to-enhance-
accountability-of-ioc-as-members-speak-out-on-corruption-allegations. 
 44. Legal Affairs, OLYMPIC.ORG, https://www.olympic.org/legal-affairs (last 
visited Oct.29, 2017). 
 45. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1, at 51. 
 46. Id. 
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unclear from the IOC’s public materials why the Executive Board 
activated the Legal Affairs Commission as of October 2017.  
The IOC asserts its direct control over the Olympic Games. The IOC 
chooses the date of the Olympiad and the host city to which it will 
“entrust” the Games.47 A host city is represented by an Olympic Game 
Organizing Committee (OGOC). In its early years, the IOC’s selection 
process for host cities was more the result of picking cities that 
succumbed to the IOC’s begging rather than being at the IOC’s 
choosing.48 Since the advent of television rights, the IOC’s relationship 
to Olympic Games host cities has remarkably changed.49 Host city 
elections generally occur seven years before a Game is to be held.50 As 
part of the bidding process, the national government of an applicant city 
must execute a contractual agreement with the IOC to respect the 
Olympic Charter.51  
The IOC contract to host the Olympic Games with a host city’s 
government is broad and can even trump some citizenship rights 
established by that government.52 The IOC closely controls the day-to-
day and even minute details of OCOG operations.53 The IOC also 
controls those entities able to act within the Olympic Movement by 
granting authorization to individual sport IFs and each NOC. By 
accepting IOC authorization, the IFs and NOCs agree to meet those 
obligations imposed by the IOC.54 While recognition does come with 
some funding to be handed down by the IOC,55 most of the parties’ 
obligations are handed down from the IOC without an articulated 
  
 47. See id. at ¶ 3–¶ 4, at 71.  
 48. ROBERT K. BARNEY ET AL., SELLING THE FIVE RINGS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND THE RISE OF OLYMPIC COMMERCIALISM x (2002)(Preface). 
 49. Id. at 181–82. 
 50. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 2, at 72. 
 51. Id. at ¶ 3.  
 52. See Sagen v. Vancouver Org. Comm. for the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic 
Winter Games, [2009] B.C.C.A. 522, ¶. 48–50. (Can. B.C.C.A.). 
 53. Id. at ¶ 15–16. 
 54. Id. at ¶ 22 (noting “IFs and NOCs take direction only from the IOC”). 
 55. Revenue Sources and Distribution, OLYMPIC.ORG, 
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-financing-revenue-sources-distribution (last visited Oct. 29, 
2017). The IOC represents that 90% of Olympic Movement revenues are distributed to 
NOCs, IFs, and OGOCs. Id. 
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corresponding responsibility for the IOC as to the actions of the IF or 
NOC. 
B. International Sports Federations (IFs) 
The IOC has the authority to grant recognition to those IFs which 
administer one or more sports at a global level. IFs that are granted IOC 
recognition must conform to the IOC’s requirements laid out in Chapter 
3 of the Olympic Charter.56 This requirement seems somewhat 
disingenuous, as the Olympic Charter also states that IFs will otherwise 
maintain independence and retain autonomous sport administration.57 
IOC requirements for IFs include establishment  and enforcement of the 
rules of the IF’s sport and the Olympic Charter; to show support for and 
participation in the IOC; and to take responsibility, technical control, and 
direction of the IF’s particular sport during the Olympic Games.58  
In other words, the IOC mandates that IFs that wish to be recognized 
by the IOC, and thus gain the opportunity for the IF’s sport to be an 
Olympic Event, must show fealty to the IOC. The IF must then supervise 
practice of the IF’s sport at the Olympic Games. In short, the IOC 
dictates the manner in which the IF administers the IF’s sport. Therefore, 
it is hard to say whether the IFs truly retain a position of autonomous 
administration. 
C. National Olympic Committees (NOCs) 
The Olympic Charter states that NOCs have the mission of 
“develop[ing], promot[ing] and protect[ing] the Olympic Movement 
[with]in their respective countries.”59 The IOC utilizes its revenues in 
part to support NOC activities in developing world nations, such as 
funding basic athletic facilities.60 Much like those obligations imposed on 
IFs by official recognition, IOC-recognized NOCs are obligated to 
  
 56. See IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1, at 58. 
 57. Id. at 57.  
 58. Id. ¶ 1, at 58.  
 59. Id. ¶ 1, at 61.  
 60. Revenue Sources and Distribution, supra note 50.  
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“ensure the observance of the Olympic Charter in their countries.”61 The 
Olympic Charter is rather vague as to the accountability imposed by the 
IOC upon an NOC to demonstrate how the NOC fulfills its obligations to 
the IOC, or otherwise justifies the receipt of IOC funding. General 
governance principles would assume there is some sort of reporting 
structure to channel information up the hierarchy as a condition of 
funding flowing down from the party that controls the purse. 
Recognition by the IOC creates additional responsibilities for the 
NOC specific to the Olympic Games. A NOC must establish an Olympic 
Team on behalf of the NOC’s nation.62 IOC recognition obligates NOCs 
to send athletes to participate in the Summer Games.63 NOCs also must 
play a role in a country’s Olympic Games host bid. Assuming multiple 
cities within a country wish to submit a bid for evaluation as an Olympic 
host city, the country’s NOC is responsible for choosing which city will 
be nominated on behalf of its country. 64  The NOC will have supervisory 
authority over the OGOC should its nomination be accepted as a Games 
host city.65 In other words, the NOC, with its independent obligations to 
the IOC, has a role in the bidding process and evaluation completed by 
the IOC.66 Therefore, the IOC has granted itself a role on both sides of 
the negotiating table for an Olympic host bid. 
D. The World Anti-Doping Agency and the International Court for 
the Arbitration of Sport 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established in 1999, in 
part by the IOC. Today, WADA receives half of its funding from the 
IOC and the remaining half from other world governments.67 The 
Olympic Charter mandates compliance with the World Anti-Doping 
  
 61. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 2, at 61. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. ¶ 3, at 62. The Summer Games are the official event that begins the 
quadrennial Olympiad period. See, e.g., COOL RUNNINGS (Walt Disney Pictures 1993). 
 64. IOC, supra note 3, ¶ 1.3, at 73. 
 65. Id. ¶ 1.4.  
 66. See id.  
 67. Funding, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/funding (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
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Code for anyone participating in the Olympic Movement.68 The IOC 
delegates to WADA daily management of the anti-doping program at the 
Olympics.69  
The International Court for the Arbitration of Sport (ICAS) is also a 
creation of the IOC.70 The Court was intended as a sport-specific forum.71 
An International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) judge and past IOC vice 
president has described the CAS as a body which sets rules and legal 
norms for the IOC’s governance.72 While the CAS may have been 
intended as an ICJ for sport, its powers are limited to arbitration of 
matters that the parties have a pre-existing agreement to subject to the 
CAS. Therefore, matters which do not arise out of a contractual 
agreement cannot be brought before the ICAS. 
III. THE IOC’S FAILURES DESPITE ITS CURRENT 
BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM 
The IOC has developed a bureaucratic scheme to administer the 
Olympic Movement at the global, national, and local levels, including an 
adjudicative forum (ICAS) and enforcement agency (WADA). The IOC 
sanctions sports adjudications through the ICAS and polices the activities 
of athletes through WADA. However, this system has failed its athletes 
at multiple levels. These failures, including bidding corruption, human 
rights abuses, and the lack of effective controls through existing IOC 
bureaucracies, will be discussed. These governance failures will be 
contrasted with the IOC’s careful management of its revenue-generating 
intellectual property rights.  
  
 68. IOC, supra note 3, at 81. 
 69. See Report of the Independent Observers: Games of the XXXI Olympiad, Rio 
de Janeiro 2016, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 4, https://www.wada-
ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/rio2016_io_team_report_26102016.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2017at) 
 70. History of the CAS, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) 
 71. Id. 
 72. MILLER, supra note 7, at 327. 
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A. Bidding Corruption 
Corruption (or at least the possibility of corruption) lurks beneath 
every transaction required in the IOC bidding process.73 The Olympic 
Games pose a significant opportunity for a host city to receive positive 
international recognition and can serve as a platform to elevate 
international prestige, assuming the Games and the surrounding logistics 
are well-managed.74  However, that assumption has not played out 
historically. Nearly every Games held in the last forty years, Summer or 
Winter Games, has had at least one set of questionable circumstances, if 
not an outright scandal, associated with its bidding process or 
execution.75 As the IOC either directly or indirectly controls both sides of 
the negotiation table, it effectively engages in what is at best a mild form 
of self-dealing for each Olympic Games. 
The bidding corruption and bribery uncovered have led to some 
individuals facing criminal charges, but the IOC has denied that it 
encourages or allows a culture of gift-giving that facilitates these illegal 
actions.76 The IOC’s official history states that lavish treatment was the 
expectation of a “minority of IOC members.”77 The IOC Executive 
Committee had established membership rules that were wantonly 
ignored, and for a period its leadership felt it was normal for an 
organization of this scope to have a few “rotten apples in the barrel.”78 
Salt Lake City, Utah and Nagano, Japan fiercely competed for the 
hosting rights to the 1998 Winter Olympic Games. Nagano’s selection 
was attributed to an ability to outspend the Salt Lake City Organizing 
  
 73. See generally Julie H. Liu, Note and Comment, Lighting the Torch of Human 
Rights: the Olympic Games as a Vehicle for Human Rights Reform, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 213 (2007).  
 74. See id. at 235. 
 75. See, e.g., Gerry Brown, Controversy and Scandal at the Winter Olympics, 
INFOPLEASE https://www.infoplease.com/controversy-and-scandal-winter-olympics (last 
accessed December 2, 2018). MILLER, supra note 7, at 327. As a counterpoint, Keba 
M’Baye, an ICJ Judge and past IOC Vice-President, stated in an interview with David 
Miller that abuses of conduct standards hardly constitute corruption, given the term’s 
“legal meaning.” Id.  
 76. Id. at 328. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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Committee (SLOC).79 Salt Lake City was subsequently awarded the 2002 
Winter Olympic Games. It was later uncovered that the SLOC had gone 
to great lengths to assure a second bid would be successful, including 
lavish trips for IOC members and college scholarships for members’ 
children.80 Criminal charges were brought against the leaders of the 
SLOC,81 which the SLOC leadership defended as within normal bid city 
practices.82 While the SLOC’s leaders were eventually acquitted, the 
damage was done.83 In the aftermath, then-IOC President Juan Antonio 
Samarach was called to testify before a United States Congressional 
panel.84 Multiple reform efforts were launched at this time. 
The 2012 Sochi Winter Olympic Games experience will likely have a 
profound impact on the future of Olympic host city bids. To some credit, 
no corruption or bribery involving the IOC has been alleged in the wake 
of Russia’s bid for its first Winter Games. However, Russia’s endemic 
internal corruption is believed to have contributed to the overall cost of 
the Sochi Olympics.85 At a cost of over $50 billion USD, the Sochi 
Games will be remembered for being the most expensive Games to 
date.86 
The full scope of how Rio de Janiero was selected to host the 2016 
Olympic Games is still being uncovered. In October 2017, Carlos 
Nuzman, the simultaneous head of both the Rio OGOC and Brazilian 
NOC, was arrested and suspended from his Olympic duties.87 A 
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whistleblower has come forward with allegations that the IOC was on 
notice of Nuzman’s corruption prior to the 2016 Rio Games and failed to 
investigate.88 Thus far, the legal definition of corruption may have been 
met: allegations include that Nuzman and others made bribery payments 
in exchange for votes supporting Rio’s bid.89 The investigation has 
ensnared one IOC Executive Board member, who has voluntarily stepped 
down while under investigation for bribes he may have accepted. 90 
B. The IOC Shuns Ownership for Abuses in the Olympic Games  
The fundamental principles of Olympism set forth “a philosophy of 
life[:]” the “practice of sport is a human right,” which should be possible 
without discrimination and with mutual understanding.91 This right is 
largely asserted on behalf of sport participants, i.e. athletes. However, 
athletes cannot practice sport, let alone participate in an international 
competition, without appropriate facilities.  
In the construction of those facilities for each Olympic Games, there 
are frequent allegations of discrimination, labor abuses, and other human 
rights concerns. Following a host city’s selection, the IOC imposes a 
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strict construction timetable for the Olympic Games.92 There is a history 
of these abuses occurring, particularly in the countries where the IOC is 
hoping to expand Olympic interest.93 Yet the IOC is willing to give lip 
service to these problems as the product of either the host city OGOC’s 
or country NOC’s failure to adequately plan.  
The Olympic Games in some sense are an equalizer, where athletes 
from all nations compete on the same field. However, construction of the 
Olympic Games’ venues has a disproportional negative impact on lower 
income populations.94 The sites chosen for Olympic events often require 
the forced eviction of a disadvantaged group.95 While the standardized 
Olympic Host City Contract references land acquisition as part of venue 
development, it does not set forth any detailed obligations for the OGOC 
or expectations of the IOC.96 While the IOC encourages consideration of 
sustainability and legacy,97 the IOC does not involve itself in ongoing 
inspections of venues during construction.  
The nomadic nature of the Olympic Games necessitates that new 
facilities are constructed for each Games. Labor abuses are frequently 
perceived during and after the construction of Olympic facilities.98 The 
preparations for each Olympiad raise human rights concerns for those 
construction workers subject to inhumane work hours for inadequate 
wages with little or no health and safety protections.99 The Host City 
Contract mandates the size of hanging space for clothes in the Olympic 
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Village rooms, yet does not create any obligations regarding construction 
management.100 This area of human rights abuse will continue as Games 
are held in developing world nations without human rights laws or strict 
labor protections.  
Although the IOC now encourages temporary or demountable venues, 
the permanent venue spaces are often under-utilized post-Games. The 
result is further disenfranchisement of the poor for the benefit of a few 
select wealthy individuals.101 For example, infrastructure development 
generally does not meet the long-term needs of host city citizens.102 
While it is easy to say that these problems are not for the IOC to solve, 
the fact that such problems arise in, during, or after each Olympic Games 
suggests the IOC is in position to develop a solution for these long-term 
problems through the Host City Contracting process.103 Such scrutiny 
may ultimately prevent the downstream negative perceptions which 
former host city residents then attribute to the Olympic Movement and 
protect the reputation of the Olympic Movement. 
Human trafficking is also a problem at many major sporting events. 
The Olympics Games are no exception to this sad fact.104 The IOC has 
not directly spoken to the issue of human trafficking, although its charter 
references social responsibility and improving socio-economic 
conditions in communities which host the Olympic Games.105 However, 
the massive media undertaking that is the Games today creates multiple 
opportunities for human traffickers to operate.106 While human 
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trafficking is not the focus of this paper, it cannot go unmentioned in a 
dissection of the Modern Olympic Games’ major flaws. 
C. Failures in Anti-Doping Controls 
Concerns of athletic performance enhancement have long been an 
issue in the Olympic Games.107 A variety of substances can be used to 
increase performance, ranging from pharmaceutical cornucopias of 
steroids to infusions of red blood cells (known as blood doping).108 
Throughout modern Olympic history, performance enhancement was to 
some degree an unspoken part of Olympic culture, with more retribution 
for those who spoke out against doping than those who doped.109 
The U.S. is one of many countries to encourage or turn a deliberate 
blind eye to athletic performance enhancement, with complicity from the 
leaders of U.S. sports organizations and the U.S.O.C. in the 1980s and 
1990s.110 In 2016, Russia was exposed to have organized an elaborate 
state-sponsored system to assure its athletes were able to compete in an 
enhanced state at the Sochi Olympics.111 WADA’s subsequent McLaren 
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Report found that the Russian government and Sochi OGOC swapped 
Russian athlete samples processed in testing laboratories to enable those 
athletes to remain in competition.112 The IOC has claimed to offer 
support to Yulia Stepanova, one of the whistleblowers to expose the 
Russian system, but denied it had any responsibility to offer her security, 
even after her competition accounts were hacked.113  
The Chinese have also been accused of subjecting national athletes to 
a systematic doping scheme.114 Recent allegations report that more than 
10,000 Chinese athletes were subjected to a mandatory doping system 
and that dissenters were either dropped from their sport teams or jailed.115 
Past accounts of Chinese state-sponsored doping have alleged this 
system starts with athletes as young as eleven years old.116 
Following the Rio 2016 Olympic Games, WADA retained an 
independent observer to analyze the Games’ anti-doping program 
performance.117 The Rio Report notes several complete logistical failures 
not solely attributable to any party: these process gaps and budget 
cutbacks resulted in limited anti-doping program resources, limited 
resources for chaperones to supervise testing, and an inability to fine 
athletes for violations.118 The Rio Report does not single out any national 
teams for testing non-compliance.119 The report notes that the overall 
logistical failures were “foreseeable and entirely avoidable.”120 Given the 
IOC’s asserted level of control over OCOG operations, these failures 
should be attributed, to some degree, to the IOC. 
Athletes compete and audiences spectate with the expectation of a 
level playing field. The IOC’s stated role in anti-doping is “to protect 
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clean athletes and the integrity of sport” through actions taken to prohibit 
doping, competition manipulation, and the political or commercial abuse 
of athletes.121  Additionally, the IOC states it will promote protections for 
athlete medical care and health needs as well as their social and 
professional futures.122 However, these efforts are likely not enough to 
establish effective controls and prevent illegal performance 
enhancements, especially where the IOC refuses to take reasonable 
actions in response to known issues.123 Current IOC practices will likely 
dissuade future whistle-blowers, who can look to Yulia Stepanova and 
assume that the IOC may ban them and will not protect those who 
uncover doping schemes. 
D. The IOC in the Legal System 
The ICAS was created by the IOC with the vision that it would 
function as “a kind of Hague Court for Sport.”124 What resulted was an 
international arbitration forum for contractual and tort matters. However, 
not all sports-related disputes are taken to this forum for arbitration.125  
As a result, matters involving the IOC as a defendant are just as likely 
to be presented to a traditional court as to the Court of Sport. The IOC, 
despite its global operations, is able to have claims against it dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction or to push Switzerland as the more appropriate 
forum.126 The transient nature of Olympic events would likely make it 
impossible for a wronged athlete to know where he or she can even 
establish jurisdiction; let alone that the athlete will have the resources to 
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bring the matter before a court with the proper jurisdiction.127 
Additionally, Swiss Private International Law allows the CAS to 
determine its own jurisdiction regarding matters brought before it.128 As a 
result, despite a sport-exclusive forum, many possible legal disputes may 
end up in a judicial black hole without any venue for recourse.129 
On the plaintiff’s side, the IOC has been quick to assure legal 
enforcement of its intellectual property rights. The IOC has either 
directly established its rights to intellectual property identifying the 
Olympic Movement or has required that an NOC obtain and enforce 
those rights in that NOC’s country on behalf of the IOC.130 For example, 
the IOC requires that NOCs and OGOCs assert legal claims on the IOC’s 
behalf or risk loss of the NOC or OCOG’s own authorization.131 This has 
resulted in numerous lawsuits to prohibit unauthorized use of the 
Olympic symbol and the Olympic Games broadcast.132  
The IOC has utilized its supreme authority to regulate those in the 
Olympic Movement hierarchy but has insulated itself from scrutiny or 
review. The IOC is a proponent of, and continues to use, the traditional 
justice system when such use asserts the rights of or otherwise benefits 
the IOC’s revenues or reputation.133 However, the IOC is quick to seek 
dismissal of those lawsuits that do not benefit the IOC’s revenues or 
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reputation.134 Additionally, the IOC also puts forth a forced-arbitration 
system for athletic disputes and contractual matters.  
IV. CAN THIRD PARTIES ASSERT CONTROL OVER THE IOC? 
The system which the IOC has built to manage the Olympic 
Movement is unsustainable. The problem stems from the nature of the 
IOC itself: IOC Session and Executive Board members are international 
business and political leaders, a group accustomed on some level to the 
use of lavish gifts, corporate largesse, bribery, and extortion as a means 
of facilitating transactions.135 How can the IOC be expected to police its 
members and subsidiaries for behavior that many would find generally 
acceptable? The obvious answer is for there to be a means of third-party 
accountability for the IOC.136  
The IOC has registered itself as a legal person and regularly asserts 
legal rights it derives from that persona. However, as a legal entity, the 
IOC could reasonably have duties imposed in response to its actions.  
Creating a system of accountability for the IOC beyond itself, 
whatever type of entity it is, could be achieved through a variety of 
paths. General corporate governance standards include some measure of 
accountability for leadership to the organization at large.137 The IOC 
could be recognized as an international legal person equivalent to a state 
actor and thus subject to international laws and accountable to the global 
community at large. Individual countries could exert stricter controls on 
the actions of non-state actors which would like to host, sponsor, or 
oversee the organization of events within the country. Finally, the IOC 
could change itself and the way it operates to be more accountable and 
transparent to its global constituents.  
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A. Can the International Community Demand Accountability and 
Assert Control Over the IOC? 
Whatever standard the IOC wishes to have applied, it does not seem 
justifiable that the IOC can continue to claim international rights as a 
legal person without corresponding legal duties.138 Despite the lack of 
clear international law on this issue, there is an argument to be made that 
international legal personality should carry both rights and obligations.139  
If the IOC is established as an international person, it could be held liable 
for the criminal actions or inactions of IOC Executive Board and General 
Session members. William Worster argues that “where an international 
organization violates international law, it is held responsible under 
international law.”140 International law is typically thought of as applied 
to only to state actors. However, non-state actors may assert legal 
personhood in some situations or specific relationships.141  
The IOC is technically a non-state actor yet presents itself more as a 
state than a corporation.142 For example, the IOC cited its constitution 
and organizational structure to prevent the dismissal of a President just as 
a corporation could dismiss a CEO.143 The IOC styles its members as 
ambassadors from the IOC back to the member’s nation of origin.144 
Where a non-state actor has chosen to blur the lines as to its own status, 
what can be done?  
Clear laws do not exist as to whether an entity is a person or not for 
international purposes. Worster describes two tests to determine the role 
of a non-state actor: through the actor’s objective actions, or through 
actions taken towards the actor.145 Under either prong, the IOC can be 
considered an international legal person.146 The value of this personhood 
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assessment is whether the entity can be held responsible for international 
crimes before the International Court of Justice.147  
For example, the United Nations was determined to be an 
international legal person, after review by the ICJ.148 Legal personhood 
for a non-state actor is by some measures rather like the children’s story 
The Velveteen Rabbit, in that the non-state actor’s status can be defined 
by a state actor’s response. Do state actors seem willing to perceive the 
IOC as a legal person? Recent actions by the United States to investigate 
the IOC as an entity, as well as its individual members, may not support 
that conclusion.  
On the other hand, the ICJ has previously protected an international 
organization from some aspects of legal personhood.149 For example, in 
the 1999 Simic proceedings, the ICJ ruled that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was not under the court’s 
jurisdiction in the same manner as a state actor.150 The ICRC had 
intervened to prevent a former ICRC employee from providing witness 
testimony regarding observed human rights abuses.151 The ICRC cited its 
established reputation and custom in the international community as a 
confidential, neutral party as a basis for its ability to intervene and 
prevent the testimony.152 The ICJ upheld the ICRC’s position as an 
international organization, but also equated the organization’s customary 
practices to maintain confidentiality as customary international law.153  
The ICJ has thus recognized an international organization’s customary 
practices as a legal standard. In this circumstance, the ICRC appeared to 
have its cake and eat it, too. However, this recognition could have vastly 
different implications if the involved organization was the IOC. The 
ICRC could justify its confidentiality practices through both its internal 
standards and other international documents that recognized the ICRC’s 
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unique role and ultimate objective to provide humanitarian aid as a 
neutral party in armed conflicts.154 The IOC, on the other hand, does not 
enjoy the same level of third-party recognition as a humanitarian 
organization.155 Its confidentiality practices have centered around 
maintaining the reputation of the IOC in the eyes of its corporate 
sponsors. While the ICJ is not bound by precedent from an international 
criminal tribunal, the arguments which benefitted the ICRC in the Simic 
proceedings would most likely not be beneficial to the IOC’s case before 
an ICJ tribunal for several reasons.156 
First, the IOC has empowered itself through the Olympic Charter and 
the Fundamental Principles of Olympism to have a specific political role 
and to “play an active part in bringing about change in the context and 
practice of international sport through adherence to human rights.”157 The 
IOC has previously utilized the Olympic Games as a means to facilitate 
political opinion.158 For example, the IOC has previously used the 
Olympic Charter to justify exclusion of South Africa during apartheid.159 
Therefore, unlike the ICRC, the IOC has empowered itself to actually 
take actions that assert a political voice.  
Second, the IOC is recognized as an international promulgator of 
sports standards by courts.160 The standards that the IOC sets, such as for 
the definition of a sport, have been persuasive authority for courts such 
as the European Court of Justice in issuing judgements, which is akin to 
the role of customary international law.161 The IOC is recognized as the 
global regulatory body for athletic competition.162 By contrast to the 
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Simic proceedings, the ICRC does not promulgate standards that hold the 
weight of customary international law.163 
Under Worster’s theory, it may not be necessary to respect the 
traditional legal personality protections granted to international 
organizations should the organization commit a violation of international 
law.164 The United Nations Convention on Corruption, adopted in 2003, 
is an instrument designed to address the illicit diversion of public funds 
for personal gain, particularly in developing countries.165 It encourages 
measures to regulate both public and private sector entities.166 This 
Convention has been ratified by the majority of U.N. members,167 and 
thus could be considered customary international law.168 
This paper has enumerated several instances where the IOC has likely 
violated international law or where the circumstances demonstrate a lack 
of institutional integrity that merits serious consideration before an ICJ 
tribunal.169 The IOC’s current bidding system creates perverse financial 
incentives and provide ample opportunity for greed to flourish. Even 
more troubling is the IOC’s lack of ownership or authority in the face of 
state-sanctioned doping programs.170 In both scenarios, whistleblowers 
have come forward without protection from the IOC. Both scenarios 
carry a significant human cost. Yet, whether the issue is doping or 
bribery, the IOC has put its reputation and revenues ahead of the 
  
 163. Statement: We must listen and act, not impose, ICRC (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-presidents-address-community-engagement-and-
accountability (noting the passive nature of the ICRC’s involvement in situations); see 
also ICRC, supra note 149 (noting the ICRC mission is to follow and not create 
international humanitarian law). 
 164. See generally Worster, supra note 117, at 211–12, 216. 
 165. See G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Convention Against Corruption, at 5, (Oct. 31, 
2003), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-
50026_E.pdf.  
 166. See id. at 10–11, 14–15. 
 167. UN Convention Against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status, 
UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2017). 
 168. See, e.g., VALERIE EPPS & LORIE GRAHAM, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d. ed. 2014). 
 169. See supra Section III.A.  
 170. See supra Section III.C.  
2019] An Olympic Joke: Sanctioning the Olympic Movement 331
  
protections it could offer, and asserts those that denigrate the values of 
the Olympic Movement.171 
B. Can Individuals States Demand Accountability and Assert 
Control Over the IOC? 
Another possible justification for action against the IOC could arise 
out of the IOC’s Swiss legal personage and new Swiss criminal statutes. 
In 2015, Switzerland amended its Criminal Code through a bill known in 
the media as “Lex FIFA.”172 This set of laws, which became effective 
July 1, 2016, makes it a criminal offense to bribe foreign public officials, 
or to give or accept bribes to a private individual that acts in an official 
capacity on behalf of a third party.173 However, the geographic extent to 
which this recent amendment to the Swiss Criminal Code applies is 
unclear. By contrast, Germany’s anti-bribery law states that it applies to 
offenses that occur within Germany and outside of Germany by or 
against a German.174  
There are two nuances of note that may expand the reach of this new 
Swiss law: Switzerland’s agency statute175 and its corporate criminal 
liability statute.176 Swiss agency law creates a special obligation for 
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violations by governing officers of legal entities.177 Thus, any criminal 
law violation by a member of the IOC Executive Board could have 
ramifications under Swiss law for the IOC. While the IOC has been able 
to distance itself from the agents of alleged Olympics agents,178 the 
unfolding action against an IOC Executive Board member could enable a 
Swiss prosecutor to bring formal charges against the IOC as a whole.179 
Additionally, “Lex FIFA” amended the Swiss corporate criminal 
liability statute to penalize a legal entity that “has failed to take all the 
reasonable organisational [sic] measures that are required in order to 
prevent such an offence” regardless of the involved natural person’s 
criminal liability.180 To avoid “Lex FIFA” penalties, the IOC must 
demonstrate the organizational measures it has taken to prevent criminal 
actions by its rogue members.181 As this paper has laid out, there is ample 
evidence available to Swiss prosecutors to demonstrate that the IOC is on 
notice of such a risk, and has even acknowledged such in its official 
history.182 The question would be whether past IOC reforms have been 
reasonable enough measures, given the possible reforms that have been 
left on the table.  
Finally, U.S. standards merit some discussion as the American 
corporate marketplace is the financial base of the IOC.183 For example, 
most American corporations indemnify their officers and directors.184 
The IOC, by contrast to American standards, has let its members take the 
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blame individually and derides them as bad actors.185 The IOC could 
argue that this demonstrates that it is not a corporate entity, but a 
constitutionally-driven entity, and thus should not be subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction.186 While this argument may keep the IOC out of a U.S. 
courtroom, it would bolster the previous argument that the IOC should 
appear before the ICJ to answer for its failures. 
C. Can the IOC Reform Itself? 
There is also the possibility of reform coming from within the 
Olympic Movement. “Voluntary” reforms could be required of the IOC 
from its own internal stakeholders.187 Reform is not possible without 
some amount of transparency, as “public availability of pertinent 
information about the decisions of global administrators and their 
consequences fosters public discussion and debate about a body’s 
policies and performance.”188 Reform efforts could be justified by the 
IOC’s self-imposed mission “to strengthen the unity of the Olympic 
Movement, to protect its independence and to preserve the autonomy of 
sport.”189 In the case of the IOC, its ultimate constituents and those who 
could theoretically wield power are the athletes themselves. 
Alternatively, either corporate sponsors or host cities could demand the 
IOC address its issues as a condition of either advertising or host city 
contract negotiations.  
Without athletes, there would be no reason to stage the Olympic 
Games or for the IOC to exist. Despite the centrality of athletic 
performance to the Olympic Movement, the majority of athletes have 
little to no say in the direction of the IOC or even have information 
regarding the IOC’s decision-making process.190 Information is essential 
“for the effective exercise of decisional participation rights by those who 
have some role in the internal decisional process but are not powerful 
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founders or members.”191 Therefore, the IOC should expand its athlete 
membership and involvement in IOC decisions. 
The IOC could argue that it has previously committed to involving 
athletes in Olympic Movement strategic development. As of 2015, there 
are fifteen permanent seats reserved for athlete representatives in the IOC 
Session.192 However, these seats are only 13% of the entire 115-member 
Session.193 The IOC’s steps to expand participation by current athletes is 
insufficient, as it lacks a true balance of power requisite for 
accountability.194 One way to expand athlete participation could be to 
permit at least one athlete from each nation’s Olympic team to share the 
seat of an IOC Session member from the same country. Alternatively, the 
Athlete Congress could be empowered as an additional organ of the IOC 
with the same power and rank as the IOC Session, giving the IOC a 
bicameral form of governance.  
The IOC to some extent includes former athletes among its leadership 
ranks.195 However, those leaders appear to be more focused on 
maintaining their current reputation than improving the equality of 
athletic performance.196 For example, athletes strongly supported a ban of 
all athletes involved in the Russian doping scandal in 2016, yet IOC 
leadership refused a total ban on the Russian Federation team for concern 
of “death and devastation.”197 Some nations’ Olympic Committees may 
serve a broad role as a ministry of sport.198 Retired U.S. athletes who 
have found some ability to assert their voice and opinions may lack 
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current standing or be limited by statutes of limitation to actually bring 
charges.199  
A second possible constituent that could assert demands on the IOC 
are the bidding and selected host cities for the Olympic Games.200 This 
group could possibly justify expanded transparency through analysis and 
application of the Olympic Charter.201 The national government of an 
applicant city is obligated to execute a binding agreement with the IOC 
to, among other things, respect the Olympic Charter.202 The power of this 
contract can override provisions of the country’s own constitution.203 
Thus, much as the IOC has used this agreement to achieve its own 
political ends, the national governments of those cities seeking to bid for 
future Olympic Games could impose their own conditions for hosting 
upon the IOC.  
However, while the bidding and host cities may be powerful 
constituents, these entities are unlikely to assert power. First, multiple 
host nation applicants would have to agree to be willing to use this power 
in order to achieve a goal. If one nation were to go alone against the IOC, 
the IOC could simply refuse to consider that nation’s host city 
application. The mutually-assured negotiating position could be possible 
given the number of cities that have backed out of the bidding process in 
recent years, leading to a smaller pool of applicants. The second reason 
why this may not work is more cynical: it is cheaper for host cities to 
bow out of the Olympic circus than to try and fight, and addressing those 
concerns would likely only add to the expense of hosting an Olympic 
Games. 
One last constituent that could wield influence over the IOC are its 
corporate sponsors. The IOC has traditionally had the upper hand in 
negotiations with host cities through its control of Olympic Games’ 
television and merchandising rights, which can generate revenues shared 
with the OGOC.204 Olympic Games Organizing Committees (OGOC) are 
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also responsible for securing private financial resources which 
underwrite the expenses of hosting an Olympic Games.205 Meanwhile, 
athletes are barred from supporting their own sponsors, using their image 
for advertising during the Games, or receiving compensation for 
Olympic participation.206 Therefore, corporate sponsors have a powerful 
voice and influence over IOC decisions. For example, it was in the 
interest of corporate sponsorship that the IOC began to relax its rules 
regarding professional athlete competition in the Olympic Games.207  
Most corporations now have policies and statements that support 
human rights and oppose human trafficking, discrimination, and 
substance abuse.208 One sponsor publicly demanding the IOC take 
actions to improve the Olympic Movement or the money walks may 
create enough of a public stir that the IOC would listen. Where courts, 
countries, athletes, and host cities fail, perhaps the IOC’s corporate 
sponsors may succeed. 
A final option available to the IOC at this juncture is to begin the 
process of total Olympic Movement reform from within the Movement. 
The answer could be to abandon the nomadic tradition of Olympics 
Games travelling between host cities as it has done for more than a 
century. In its place, the IOC could establish permanent Olympic Games 
facilities.209 One suggestion has called for a Summer Olympic Games 
facility in Greece with a similar Winter Olympics Games facility in a 
climate-appropriate location, such as Lausanne, Switzerland.210 Each 
location could host year-round training facilities that could make 
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oversight logistically easier and reduce costs for individual countries to 
enter competition, as otherwise international competition remains cost 
prohibitive and serves as a means of class exclusion.211 
The IOC should strongly consider support of this option. A permanent 
Olympic City would enable the IOC to assert tighter control over the 
Olympic Games and related Olympic Movement events and eliminate 
the need for OGOCs. This can offer cost savings even to the IOC, which 
now visits host cities at the IOC’s expense.212 While the Summer 
Olympics have been committed through 2028, the IOC was likely only 
able to secure host cities after granting concessions on fees amid 
concerns of skyrocketing host costs.213 Corporate sponsors could be 
offered involvement to offset the initial construction costs.214 
Additionally, a permanent location could present new opportunities for 
and greater control over advertising.215 The Olympic Movement touts its 
marketing abilities,216 and the IOC controls the money Olympics receive 
through sponsors and advertising.  
However, there are several challenges to this final reform option. The 
locations suggested for a permanent location—Athens, Greece and 
Lausanne, Switzerland—have strong ties to the Olympic tradition, but all 
are European destinations. Europeans hold almost half of all IOC seats, 
and have led the IOC for the majority of its history.217 There is little 
involvement of non-Europeans, even Americans, in the current IOC 
leadership.218 A permanent European home for the Olympic Games could 
be alienating to the majority of the world. 
More cynically, this reform option goes against the current interests of 
IOC. It is widely reputed that bribes influence the location of the 
Olympics, and thus, eliminating the selection process also eliminates a 
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potential payday for IOC members.219 A permanent home for the 
Olympic Games, especially in the IOC’s own backyard in Lausanne, 
certainly prevents the opportunity for first-class travel to a variety of 
locations around the world.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.N.’s 2030 goals include recognition of sport as a means of 
individual empowerment and advancing social peace.220 While the IOC 
claims this as a “historic moment” for itself,221 this singular paragraph 
does not mention the Olympics in particular or the IOC at all. Perhaps 
this is for the better. The world’s most popular sport, football, requires 
nothing more than “kick[ing] a ball toward[s] a goal without using their 
hands.”222 Running is another nearly-universal pursuit that can be 
practiced simply by testing how far one’s feet can carry them, shoes 
optional. Sport is a fundamental human right, and both of these nearly-
universal pursuits can and should be enjoyed without the elaborate 
infrastructure, bureaucrats, or performance enhancing substances. The 
Olympic Games are merely an outlet for the eternal pursuit of faster, 
higher, and stronger athletic performance.  
Citius, Altius, Fortius. 
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